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Abstract
This paper shows that the ability of the credible wage bargaining
model to match the observed unemployment volatility hinges on an
unrealistic assumption about disagreement payoffs to the firm. Re-
laxing this assumption can lead to the substantial wage flexibility.
As a consequence, the model is unable to capture the observed un-
employment volatility.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that the standard search and matching model, pioneered by
Diamond (1982), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), is unable to explain the
observed fluctuations in the labor market, which is often referred to as the
unemployment volatility puzzle. One of the prominent responses to this puzzle,
advanced by Hall and Milgrom (2008), argues that the credible wage bargaining
can generate the weak response of the current wage to productivity shocks12.
As a consequence, a firm’s profits and recruiting effort are more responsive to
productivity shocks. This ensures that job vacancies and unemployment vary
strongly with the productivity.
Under the credible bargaining, the firm and the worker take turns making
their wage offer. If the wage offer were not accepted by the counterparty, both
the worker and the firm have to face disagreement payoffs, which the worker
enjoys the flow value of nonwork and the firm faces the cost of delay. This
gives the wage as a linear combination of the productivity of the job match
and disagreement payoffs. Unlike in the Nash bargaining, the worker’s outside-
option is not a main threat in the wage negotiation. Therefore the credible
bargaining dampens the influence of labor market conditions on the wage. Hall
and Milgrom (2008) argue that this is a key reason the model can generate real
wage rigidity. This paper, however, shows that real wage rigidity in the credible
bargaining model hinges on unrealistic assumptions about disagreement payoffs
to the firm. Relaxing this assumption can deliver the substantial wage flexibility
and destroys the model’s ability to match the large volatility of unemployment
observed in the data.
In the standard search and matching frictions model of the labor market,
the cost of delay to the firm is unspecified. Hall and Milgrom (2008) interpret
this cost as the cost of idle capital and assume it is fixed. We are skeptical
about assuming a fixed cost of idle capital. Both in theory and in practice, the
firm is able to adjust the capital according to the marginal product of capital.
Since the marginal product of capital varies across the business cycle, the capital
stock also varies across the business cycle. As does the cost of idle capital. To
measure the cyclicality of the cost of idle capital, we construct the data on
capital stock per employee for the time period from 1950 through 2017. We
find that the capital stock per employee is about 1.77 times as volatile as the
labor productivity. This evidence strongly suggests that the cost of idle capital
should be pro-cyclical.
1See also Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt (2016) who incorporate the credible
wage bargaining into the New Keynesian DSGE model with search frictions in the labor
market.
2It’s worth to note that the literature has developed other approaches to address the
volatility puzzle. Some papers are based on Calvo type wage rigidities, e.g. Gertler, Sala
and Trigari (2008) and Faccini, Millard and Zanetti (2013). Some papers argue that job
destruction shocks play a prominent role in generating unemployment volatility, e.g. Fujita
and Ramey (2009), Pizzinelli, Theodoridis and Zanetti (2018). Some papers emphasize the
match-specific productivity shock, e.g. Costain and Reiter (2008) and others explore the
influence of labor market instuitions on aggregate fluctuations, e.g. Zanetti (2011a, 2011b).
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We show that under this more plausible assumption, the wage has substantial
flexibility, similar to the Nash bargained wage, and the model is unable to match
the observed fluctuations in the labor market. Those results can be obtained
even if we assume the fixed disagreement payoff to workers3 and calibrate a
low value to the probability that the wage negotiation breaks down so that the
impact of the worker’s outside option on the wage bargain is rather limited.
Those calibration strategies dampen the influence of labor market conditions
on the wage bargain and are commonly used in the literature. The failure of the
model to match the volatility data in spite of using those calibration strategies
reveals that the cost of delay to the firm is a key determinant for the wage
flexibility.
To interpret our results, we consider a positive productivity shock. This
increases the cost of delay to the firm, so the firm is eager to reach a wage
agreement. The rational worker is aware of this change. Although the delay
never occurs in equilibrium, this observation raises the threat point made by
the worker and therefore puts pressure on the firm to increase the wage.
The paper contributes to the literature in twofold. We show that the limited
influence of labor market conditions on the wage is not a sufficient condition for
real wage rigidity. In order to generate real wage rigidity, the cost of delay to
the firm has to be fixed. This reveals the fragility of credible bargaining as a
solution to the unemployment volatility puzzle.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is laid out in section 2). In
section 3), we derive an implicit wage solution. In section 4), we compare the
sharing rule obtained from credible bargaining with Nash sharing rule. In section
5) we present some evidence on both the size and the cyclicality of the cost of
idle capital. In section 6) we use the calibration strategy similar to Hall and
Milgrom (2008) to calibrate and simulate the model. In section 7) we analyze
the wage flexibility. Section 8) concludes.
2 Model
We use a stochastic discrete time version of search frictions model which retains
all the elements in Hall and Milgrom (2008). There is a continuum of identical
individuals on the unit interval. Each individual inelastically supplies one unit
of labor in every period and consumes all the income they earn. An individual is
either employed and earning a wage w, or else unemployed and receiving a flow
value b. b is defined as the flow value of nonwork. If unemployed, an individual
finds a job with probability ft. At the end of each period, existing job matches
are exogenously terminated with probability τ . Since we assume that all firms
3Recently, Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016) present evidence that the dis-
agreement payoff to workers (b) is in fact strongly pro-cyclical and argue that as a con-
sequence existing explanations of the unemployment volatility puzzle are inadequate. To
stress the importance of the cost of delay to the firm on the wage cyclicality, our paper as-
sume b to be constant.
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are identical, the value of being employed is thus
Lt = wt +
1
1 + r
Et[(1− τ)Lt+1 + τUt+1] (1)
where 11+r is the discount factor and r is the real discount rate. The value
of being unemployed is
Ut = b+
1
1 + r
Et[ftLt+1 + (1− ft)Ut+1] (2)
There is a continuum of identical firms on the unit interval. Each firm can
hire up to one worker who produces an amount yt. The value of a filled job is
Jt = yt − wt + 1
1 + r
Et[(1− τ)Jt+1 + τVt+1] (3)
where V is the value of a vacancy. Firms must pay a real per-period cost
of c at the start of each period to post a vacancy. Vacancies are then filled at
the start of the next period with probability q. We follow the timing convention
of Gertler et al (2009) and assume that new job matches become productive
immediately. The value of an open vacancy is then
Vt = −c+ 1
1 + r
Et[qt+1Jt+1 + (1− qt+1)Vt+1] (4)
Employment evolves according to
Nt = (1− τ t)Nt−1 + ht (5)
where ht is the number of workers hired. The labor market is characterized
by search frictions and so firms must post vacancies in order to hire workers.
Aggregate hiring is determined by the matching function ht = mu
α
t v
1−α
t . Defin-
ing θ = vu as labor market tightness. The probability of a firm filling a vacancy
is qt =
ht
vt
= mθ−αt and the probability that an unemployed worker finds a job
is ft =
ht
ut
= mθ1−αt = θtqt.
Imposing the free-entry condition Vt = 0 on (4), we obtain
Jt+1 = Et
c
βqt+1
(6)
Substituting (6) into (3), we obtain the job creation condition
yt − wt − λt = 0 (7)
where λt = c[(1 + r)
1
qt
− (1− τ)Et 1qt+1 ] is the real cost of hiring a worker.
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3 The Credible Bargain
Under the credible bargaining, the incentive of the parties to reach an agree-
ment depends on the bargainers’ time preference and the risk of breakdown of
negotiation. The firm and the worker understand they have a strictly higher
payoff from reaching an agreement rather than breaking up and accepting the
outside options. The firm and the worker take turns making their wage offer
denoted by wf and ww. Time in the bargaining process is divided into several
rounds of length σ. In each bargaining round, each party either accepts the
counterparty’s offer or rejects and proposes a counteroffer in the next bargain-
ing round. After a delay, the firm incurs a cost of delay γtσ while the worker
enjoys the value of nonwork bσ.
We assume that the cost of delay to the firm is pro-cyclical, γt = γyt. This
differs from Hall and Milgrom (2008) in which the cost of delay to the firm is
fixed. In the section (5), we present some evidence on this assumption.
There is a probability 1 − e−δ ≈ δ that the job opportunity is exogenously
destroyed between bargaining rounds. In that case, the firm and the worker
revert to their outside options.4 Following Boitier and Lepetit (2018), we re-
write the discount factor as an exponential function (i.e. e−r ≈ 11+r ) in order
to derive a relatively simple solution for the wage.
The optimal wage offer proposed by each party ensures that the counterparty
is indifferent between accepting the wage offer or rejecting and waiting until the
next round to make a counteroffer. As a result, the initial wage offer will be
accepted. This gives the following optimal rule for proposing wf and ww,
Lft = bσ + e
−rσ[(1− e−δσ)Ut + e−δσLwt ] (8)
Jwt = −γtσ + e−(r+δ)σJft (9)
Combining (8) and (9), using the fact that Lft + J
w
t = L
w
t + J
f
t = Lt + Jt,
we obtain the following sharing rule:
Lt − b
r + δ
− δUt
r + δ
= Jt +
γt
r + δ
(10)
Equation (10) gives the optimal condition for the wage: the net value of a
job match to the worker should be equal to the net value of a job match to the
firm. For the worker, the net value of a job match is equal to the value of being
employed net of the discounted value of nonwork and net of the discounted value
of the outside option. For the firm, the net value of a job match is equal to the
value of a filled vacancy plus the discounted cost of delay in wage negotiation.
Using the value function (1) and (3) to replace the left hand side of (8) and
(9) and then combining (8) and (9), we have:
wft +w
w
t +e
−r[(1−τ)EtLt+1+τEtUt+1]− b
r + δ
− δUt
r + δ
= yt+e
−r(1−τ)EtJt+1+ γt
r + δ
(11)
4For the worker, the outside option is unemployment, which has value U . For the firm,
the outside option is to quit the labour market or open a new job vacancy. In equilibrium,
those two options have the same value, which is zero.
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Following Hall (2017), we assume that the wage is the average 1/2(wft +w
w
t ).
Substituting (10) into (11), we obtain a solution for the wage:
wt =
yt
2
+
(r + τ)(b+ γt)
2(r + δ)(1 + r)
+
δUt
2(r + δ)
− (τr + δ)EtUt+1
2(r + δ)(1 + r)
(12)
Wage equation (12) contains three cyclical components: the labor produc-
tivity yt, the cost of delay γt and the worker’s value of outside option Ut.
4 Comparison with Nash sharing rule
It is useful to compare sharing rule (10) with Nash sharing rule. The wage under
Nash bargaining should satisfy the following sharing rule:
φJt = (1− φ)(Lt − Ut)
where φ is worker’s bargaining power. There is a major difference between
the two sharing rules. Under the Nash bargaining, a job-matching surplus is
Jt + Lt − Ut. Whereas in the strategic bargaining, since the bargainer’s main
threatening point is switched from the outside option payoff to the disagreement
payoff, a job-matching surplus is written as Jt +Lt +
γt
r+δ − br+δ − δUtr+δ . Costs of
delay to both parties enter the surplus and the impact of outside option payoff
on the wage now depends on the probability that the wage negotiation breaks
down. Hall and Milgrom (2008) assume that costs of delay to both parties
are fixed through business cycle and they calibrate an extremely low value to
the probability that the wage negotiation breaks down so that the impact of
outside option payoff on matching surplus is rather limited. In doing so, they
reduce the flexibility of job-matching surplus. In the next section, we show that
when a pro-cyclical cost of delay to the firm is considered, the wage delievers
substantial flexibility even if we fix the cost of delay to the worker and calibrate
a low weight on U.
5 The Cost of Idle Capital
Before turning to the quantitative assessment, we present some evidence on the
size and the cyclicality of the cost of idle capital. We assume the capital cost of
creating a vacancy is kt. The production function is f(1, kt) = A
ε
tk
1−ε
t , where At
is labor-augmenting productivity. As Pissarides (2000) points out, incorporating
the capital into the standard DMP model does not change any of the equations
in the model and leads to only a reinterpretation of the productivity process.
In such case, the labor productivity can be written as yt = A
ε
tk
1−ε
t − (r + d)kt ,
where r is the interest rate of renting the capital and d is the capital depreciation
rate. The firm’s cost of idle capital is (r + d)kt.
For simplicity, we assume r and d are unresponsive to a labor productivity
change. Thus, the cyclicality of the cost of idle capital solely depends on kt. We
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assume that firms can buy and sell capital in a competitive market, the optimal
amount of capital per vacancy satisfies the equilibrium condition
MPK = (1− ε)Aεtk−εt = r + d (13)
Rearrange (13), we obtain
kt = [
(1− ε)Aεt
r + d
]
1
ε (14)
Equation (14) indicates that yt is still an exogenous process. This is important
since it ensures the wage bargain is not affected by the presence of capital.
Differentiate kt with respect to At, we obtain
ηkt,At =
dkt
dAt
At
kt
= 1 (15)
Using (15), we derive the elasticity of capital per vacancy with respect to the
labor productivity,
ηkt,yt =
ηkt,At
ηyt,At
= 1 (16)
Given (16), we now can assume (r + d)kt = γyt
5.
To identify the size of the cost of idle capital relative to the labor productivity
(namely γ), we now compute the steady-state value for capital per vacancy.
Typical estimates from the national accounts imply a capital income share 1−
ε = 13 . We assume the monthly interest rate is 0.00417 (equivalent to 5%
of yearly interest rate) and the monthly capital depreciation rate is 0.00833
(equivalent to 10% of yearly depreciation rate). The value for A is chosen to
ensure the steady-state value for labor productivity equals 1. Using equation
(14) we obtain k = 23.73. Thus the cost of idle capital is (0.00417 + 0.00833)×
23.73 = 0.30. So the steady-state cost of idle capital equals 30 percent of
the average labor productivity. Our estimate is smaller than Hagedorn and
Manovskii’s estimate (0.474) but larger than Hall and Milgrom’s calibration
(0.27).
6 Simulations
In this section, we present two sets of simulation results, allowing the cost of
delay to the firm to be fixed (γ) and then to be pro-cyclical (γyt). Because
the cyclicality of the cost of delay does not affect the equilibrium wage and
5Measuring the cyclicality of the cost of idle capital is a challenging work since there is
no data on the capital associated with new vacancies. We construct an indirect measure-
ment by using the data on capital stock at constant national prices for US for the time
period from 1950 to 2017. Letting it be divided by total nonfarm payrolls, we obtain the
capital stock per employee. After taking the first difference of its logarithm, we find that
the standard deviation of the capital stock per employee is about 1.77 times as large as the
standard deviation of labor productivity.
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equilibrium unemployment, two simulations have same steady state. We choose
the calibration strategy to let the simulation with a fixed cost of delay match
the observed volatility data. Then we use the same calibration strategy to run
the simulation with a pro-cyclical cost of delay.
6.1 Calibration
Our calibration strategy is slightly different to Hall and Milgrom (2008). Unlike
Hall and Milgrom (2008) which solely focuses on the volatility of unemployment,
we let the model with a fixed cost match the volatility of four labor market
variables. They are unemployment, job vacancies, market tightness and job
finding rate. We normalize a time period to be one month. Our calibrated
parameter values are outlined in Table 1). The monthly real discount rate is set
as r = 0.417%. The average job separation rate is τ = 0.0333. So on average
3.33% of employed workers exit employment every month. We target the job
finding rate, f(θ), to be 0.576. These imply the equilibrium unemployment rate
of 5.5%, the average post-war U.S unemployment rate. The labor productivity
is set equal to one in the stationary equilibrium.
We set the elasticity of the job finding rate with respect to the labor market
tightness ratio as α = 0.4. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) find that the range
of plausible estimates of α is 0.3 and 0.5. We target the vacancy/unemployment
ratio, θ, to be 0.61, the average of the estimate made by Hall and Milgrom (2008)
and Pissarides (2009). This requires that the coefficient of matching efficiency
is set as m = f(θ)/θα = 0.57/0.610.5 = 0.77. The values of targeted variables
are shown in Table 2.
Table 1 — Values of Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Interpretation Value
τ Job Separation Rate 0.0333
r Monthly Interest Rate 0.00417
β Discount Factor 0.99583
y Labor Productivity 1
b Flow Value of Nonwork 0.68
c Vacancy Cost 0.313
γ Cost of Delay to Employer 0.3
m Matching Coefficient 0.77
α Matching Elasticity 0.4
δ Probability of Bargaining Breakdown 0.0366
We set the cost of delay to the firm in the steady state as γ = 0.30 according
to our estimate. This is different with Hall and Milgrom (2008) as they choose
6This is close to Shimer (2005b)’s estimation.
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γ to match the average level of unemployment. To retrieve the freedom to
match our calibration targets in Table-2, we choose the vacancy cost, c, as a
free parameter.
We set the opportunity cost of employment as b = 0.68. This is slightly lower
than Hall and Milgrom’s calibration but lies in the range of empirical estimates
of b, between 0.47 and 0.96, done by Chodorow-Reich and Karabarounis (2016).
0.68 is close to the average of their estimate. We find that there is no consensus
on calibrating the vacancy cost in the literature. We choose the vacancy cost
to match the average labor market tightness. In doing so, we set c = 0.313 .
This value lies in the range of 0.213 in Shimer (2005) to 0.58 in Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008). Following Hall and Milgrom (2008), we choose the probability
that bargaining breaks down, δ, to match the observed volatilities of labor
market variables by matching wage flexibility. Doing so, we set δ = 0.0366.
For the processes driving productivity shocks, we assume ρs = 0.878 for the
autoregressive component and σs = 0.01 for the volatilities of the underlying
shocks. These values generate shocks that match the autocorrelations and stan-
dard deviations of the labor productivity in the U.S data for 1951-2003 reported
in Shimer (2005a).
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Table 2 — Values of Endogenous Variables for Calibration
Parameter Interpretation Data Model
u Unemployment Rate 0.055 0.055
θ Labor Market Tightness 0.610 0.610
f Job Finding Rate 0.570 0.570
6.2 Volatilities
We use the empirical statistics in Shimer (2005a) as our simulation targets
and report them in Table-3. Table 4 describes the simulation results when the
cost of delay to the firm is fixed. Under this assumption, the model is able to
match 68% of the standard deviation of the labor market variables observed
in the data7. Our simulation can be seen as a robustness check to Hall and
Milgrom (2008) as we adopt a different calibration strategy and a different
simulation approach. Our simulation confirms the credible wage bargaining as
a prominent response to the unemployment volatility puzzle when the cost of
delay to the firm is fixed8.
7According to Hall and Milgrom’s estimate, the standard deviation of unemployment
driven by productivity is 0.68 percentage points. We see 0.68 percentage points as an upper
bound of the estimate as some papers argue that this percentage could be lower, e.g. see
Balleer (2012).
8Table 4 reveals a shortcoming of the search frictions model with credible bargaining.
The correlation of labor market variables and labor productivity is too high compared to
the data. The standard search frictions model suffers the similar problem, see Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008).
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Table 3 — Shimer’s Summary Statistics, Quarterly US Data, 1951-2003
u υ θ f y
Standard Deviation 0.190 0.202 0.382 0.118 0.020
Quarterly Autocorelation 0.936 0.940 0.941 0.908 0.878
u 1 -0.894 -0.971 -0.949 -0.408
Correlation Matrix υ – 1 0.975 0.897 0.364
θ – – 1 0.948 0.396
f – – – 1 0.396
y – – – – 1
Notes: All variables reported are log deviations from an HP trend with smoothing
parameter 105.
Table 4 — Constant Cost of Delay to Employer in the Credible Bargaining
u υ θ f y
Standard Deviation 0.128 0.140 0.252 0.151 0.020
Quarterly Autocorrelation 0.970 0.737 0.878 0.878 0.878
u 1 -0.776 -0.937 -0.937 -0.937
Correlation Matrix ν – 1 0.948 0.948 0.948
θ – – 1 1 1
f – – – 1 1
y – – – – 1
Table 5 describes the simulation results when the cost of delay to the firm
is pro-cyclical. Not surprisingly, the credible bargaining model produces too
little volatility of unemployment and vacancies from realistic fluctuations in
productivity. Comparing with the simulation results in Table-4, the simulated
volatility of unemployment, vacancies, labor market tightness and job finding
rate decreases by approximately 85%. A massive decline of the simulated volatil-
ities reveals the fragility of the credible bargaining model as a solution to the
unemployment volatility puzzle.
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Table 5 — Cyclical Cost of Delay to Employer in the Credible Bargaining
u υ θ f y
Standard Deviation 0.020 0.025 0.044 0.027 0.020
Quarterly Autocorrelation 0.970 0.737 0.878 0.878 0.878
u 1 -0.776 -0.937 0.937 -0.937
Correlation Matrix υ – 1 0.948 0.948 0.948
θ – – 1 1 1
f – – – 1 1
y – – – – 1
7 Analysis
7.1 Wage Flexibility
Our results have strong implications for wage flexibility. Table 6 shows that the
elasticity of the wage with respect to the labor productivity is close to 0.97 when
the cost of idle capital is pro-cyclical, higher than the wage elasticity under a
fixed cost of idle capital by approximately 25 percent.
Table 6— Wage Flexibility
A Constant Cost of Delay A Cyclical Cost of Delay
γ γyt
Standard Deviation of the Wage 0.0159 0.0202
Elasticity of the Wage ηw,y 0.7608 0.9665
To understand the importance of the cost of idle capital in the wage elasticity,
we consider the steady state wage equation. If we assume τ = δ, the wage can
be written as
w =
1
2
y +
1
2(1 + r)
(b+ γy) (17)
Thus, the increase in the wage elasticity due to a pro-cyclical cost of idle
capital can be mesaured by
ηw,y|pro−cyclicalγ − ηw,y|fixedγ =
y
2(1 + r)w
γ (18)
Equation (18) provides a lower bound of the estimate of the increase in the wage
elasticity as it ignores the impact of γ on the wage via the value of the worker’s
outside option. In a standard calibration, the value of y(1+r)w is normally above
1. Therefore the increase in the wage elasticity should be no less than γ2 .
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Table 7 reports the standard deviations of the wage and unemployment under
the different levels of the elasticity of the cost of idle capital with respect to the
labor productivity. For every 0.1 unit increase in the elasticity of the cost of
idle capital, the standard deviation of unemployment declines by approximately
0.01 unit, due to a small rise in the wage elasticity. Those results demonstrate
that even with a moderate elasticity of the cost of idle capital, the credible
bargaining model is unable to generate a large volatility of unemployment.
Table 7 — The Standard Deviations of the Wage and Unemployment under the
Different Levels of ηr,y
Elasticity of γ s.d of the Wage s.d of Unemployment
0.1 0.0163 0.1171
0.2 0.0167 0.1065
0.3 0.0172 0.0960
0.4 0.0176 0.0855
0.5 0.0180 0.0750
0.6 0.0185 0.0645
0.7 0.0189 0.0540
0.8 0.0194 0.0435
0.9 0.0198 0.0330
1.0 0.0202 0.0224
7.2 Market Tightness Elasticity
The comparison between two sets of simulation results reveals that a small in-
crease in wage elasticity can cause a large decrease in the simulated volatility of
unemployment, vacancies, labor market tightness and job finding rate. We ex-
plain this by considering the impact of wage elasticity on labor market tightness.
Using the labor market free-entry condition, the elasticity of market tightness
with respect to labor productivity is written as
ηθ,y = [1− (1− pi)ηw,y]
1
αpi
(18)
where pi = (y − w)/y is the profit ratio9. Since two simulations share the
steady-states, the difference in ηθ,y is,
4ηθ,y = −
w
α(y − w) 4 ηw,y (19)
The multiplier wα(y−w) in (19) shows that the impact of real wage rigidity on
the market tightness elasticity is amplified by the size of firm’s profits10. Real
9See Constain and Reiter (2008) for a similar approach.
10See Mortensen and Nagypal (2007), Zanetti (2011a) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017)
for the similar arguments.
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wage rigidity ensures that vacancy creation varies with productivity. Small
profits can lead to vacancy variation transferring strongly into unemployment
variation. When the firm’s profits are small, firms put relatively few resources
into recruiting, leading to a relatively low level of vacancies and a relatively high
level of vacancy-filling rate. For any vacancy variation, a low level of vacancies
is associated with a large percentage change of vacancies. A high vacancy-filling
rate implies that any variations in vacancies response to productivity shocks
are transmitted strongly into variations in unemployment, leading to a large
percentage change of unemployment.
8 Conclusion
This paper shows the fragility of credible wage bargaining as a solution to the
unemployment volatility puzzle. When the firm faces a pro-cyclical cost of de-
lay, the credible bargaining model is unable to match the observed fluctuations
in the labor market. Those results can be obtained even if we assume a fixed
opportunity cost of employment and calibrate a small probability that the bar-
gaining breaks down. This is because a variable cost of delay to the firm can
deliver substantial wage flexibility. Hence the wage is too volatile and firm’s
profits are less responsive to the productivity shock. This leads to the limited
fluctuations of vacancies and unemployment. Recent studies suggest that the
labor market volatility might be driven by other forces, such as the discount
rates in the financial market, e.g. Hall (2017). It’s worth to note that regard-
less of the driving force behind the labor market volatility, a certain level of
wage rigidity is essential for the search frictions model to match the data. The
credible bargaining model can deliver this only under questionable assumptions
about the disagreement payoffs. So how to model the wage formation is still an
unsolved question to the macroeconomists11.
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